United Nations S/AC.40/SR.57

Security Council

Provisional
Distr.: General
18 March 2003

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

Provisional summary record of the first part* of the 57th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 March 2003, at 9.30 a.m.

Chairman: Sir Jeremy Greenstock ..... (United Kingdom)

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* The summary record of the second part of the meeting, to be reconvened in the afternoon, appears as document S/AC.40/SR.57/Add.1.

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03-27027 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 9.35 a.m.

Special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations

Opening of the meeting and adoption of the agenda (S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/1 and S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2)

1. *The agenda was adopted.*

2. **The Chairman** said that the special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with representatives of international, regional and subregional organizations was a historic occasion in the effort against terrorism, as it was the first time that such a wide range of professionals, Member States and others involved in that effort had been gathered together. By the end of the meeting, he hoped that the participants would have woven a tighter structure of cooperation.

3. There were two channels of action in combating terrorism. The first was pursuing and bringing to justice those responsible for terrorist acts or providing support for terrorists. The second was the channel in which the Committee had been engaged for a year and a half: the essential task of dealing with the potential threat to societies and lives from individuals who had not yet been identified, or who had planned but not carried out terrorist acts. The Organization had decided to place itself at the centre of coordinating that prevention effort. The starting point of United Nations action had been Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which placed obligations on the Member States. The entire world community was vulnerable to terrorism, and protection could not be unilateral. The attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001 had been followed by attacks in Bali, Moscow, Mombasa, Bogotá and other places; no region was safe.

4. The direct impact of terrorism had been horrific, but the indirect impact had been far-reaching and equally negative, affecting economies, societies, investment, tourism and many other legitimate activities. States must work together, with a common goal, to deal with the threat. Resolution 1373 (2001) had set such a goal, building on existing global standards, including the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and it was legally binding on all States. The obligations imposed in the resolution could not be met effectively unless they were met willingly and collectively. To that end, the Counter-Terrorism Committee had been meeting weekly to further compliance with the resolution, engaging individual Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, and working through interaction and consensus.

5. The purpose of the current meeting with regional and subregional organizations was to build a common structure to deal effectively with terrorism and to help all Member States to raise their capacity to combat that phenomenon. The requirement of resolution 1373 (2001), as executed through the Committee, was that each Member State should perform to its full ability in achieving the resolution's aims. There would be differences between States, and some would need substantial assistance. No State would be asked to do more than it reasonably could, but every State would be asked to do its utmost. The current meeting was intended to help achieve that level of performance.

6. **The Secretary-General** said that he would like to thank the Chairman for chairing the Committee with distinction, energy and creativity since its establishment in October 2001; Mr. Arias, the Permanent Representative of Spain, would be succeeding him in April 2003.

7. The Committee was playing a vital role in the global effort to fight terrorism. By seeking to ensure compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), enhancing States' counter-terrorism capacity and promoting universal adherence to the counter-terrorism conventions, the Committee had demonstrated the universal nature of that challenge and the need for a universal response. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the more recent attacks in Bali, Mombasa and Moscow had shown that the scourge of terrorism knew no boundaries. Terrorism was clearly a threat to international peace and security, and the Security Council had made a commitment to fight it in every instance. The ministerial meeting of the Security Council that had taken place on 20 January 2003 had offered a fine demonstration of international commitment to that effort at the highest levels.

8. Everyone was aware, however, of how much more damage terrorists could inflict if they were to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Although recent terrorist attacks had been massive in scale, future attacks could make them pale in comparison, particularly if terrorists were to acquire lethal chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. It had never

been more important to strengthen the multilateral regimes developed to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

9. For the fight against terrorism to be effective, everyone must work together to ensure that universal principles prevailed against lawlessness. Cooperation among international, regional and subregional organizations was essential, hence the importance of the current meeting. For international efforts to be effective in countering terrorism, cooperation must be more systematic, ensuring a proper division of labour based on comparative advantages.

10. There was also a need to develop an international programme of action, founded on an unshakeable commitment to upholding the rule of law. As terrorism involved the calculated use of violence in violation of the law, responses to terrorism should aim to ensure the rule of law. Terrorist acts, particularly those involving the loss of life, constituted a grave violation of human rights. Responses to terrorism, as well as efforts to thwart it and prevent it, should uphold the human rights that terrorists aimed to destroy. Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law were essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism, not privileges to be sacrificed at a time of tension. Lastly, there was a need to strive to bridge the cultural and religious divides which led to polarization, suspicion and mistrust. All had a stake in that struggle and must feel that they were part of it.

11. In the effort to address the problem of terrorism, the United Nations and its Member States must not lose sight of the broader international agenda. While there was a clear and urgent necessity to prevent despicable acts of terror, there was also a compelling need to continue striving towards the fulfilment of the goals enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the millennium development goals. To the extent that the Organization succeeded in fighting poverty and injustice, suffering and war, it was also likely to help counter the conditions that served as justification to those who would commit acts of terror.

12. **The Chairman** urged the participants to be guided by the suggested topics for discussion appearing under each agenda item in the provisional agenda and programme of work (S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/1), rather than simply providing a general briefing on their activities, since such general information had already been distributed as part of the index of international, regional and subregional organizations (S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2) circulated by the Committee. The presence at the meeting of many Member States was welcome; their support of the work of the Committee had been appreciated. He would discuss the outcome of the meeting with all the Member States, so that they were informed of the general direction of global cooperation against terrorism.

Global standards on counter-terrorism

13. **Mr. Biggar** (Expert, Counter-Terrorism Committee) said that resolution 1373 (2001) represented the Security Council's principal response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. In adopting it, the Security Council had exercised its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Security Council resolutions were the highest norms in the international legal system, and as such imposed binding legal obligations on the Member States of the United Nations.

14. The approach of the Security Council in resolution 1373 (2001) was pragmatic: it recognized that the fight against terrorism would be protracted and had initiated a process to equip the international community to confront that phenomenon effectively and proactively. There were six key areas in which countermeasures should be taken against terrorism: legislation, financial law and practice, customs law and practice, extradition law and practice, police and law-enforcement work and illegal arms-trafficking. Although the resolution had established clear objectives, it had said relatively little about how those objectives should be achieved, a situation the Security Council had recognized when it established the Committee to monitor implementation.

15. As the first step in implementing resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council had required Member States to make an initial assessment of their counter-terrorism capacity. National assessments were reviewed by the Committee with the assistance of independent experts recruited from outside the Organization. If it made sense for the Committee to draw on the skills of individuals with specialized knowledge, it made all the more sense for the Committee to draw on the many years of knowledge and experience of international, regional and subregional organizations, which not only set standards but were in a unique position to evaluate

their members' performance in meeting those standards.

16. Banking, finance, trade, transport and travel had expanded tremendously and had acquired a global reach. While those changes had been beneficial, they had left the world vulnerable to terrorist threats. To prevent further outrages, it was essential to turn to specialist international bodies with highly focused mandates and near-universal membership. Over the years, such organizations had established standards and recommendations for safety and security in their fields, and since the attacks of 11 September 2001 they had accelerated their efforts. Organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international financial institutions had contributed to the 12 existing international conventions relating to terrorism. In the absence of an agreed definition of international terrorism, those conventions would play a key role in developing a multilateral, treaty-based system of law to combat that phenomenon. The Security Council, in resolution 1373 (2001), had recognized the importance of ratifying those Conventions, but ratification meant little unless it was backed up by implementation in domestic law. Full ratification had been achieved by 25 per cent of States, another 25 per cent of States had made some progress in that direction, and the remaining 50 per cent had done little. There was clearly room for improvement.

17. International cooperation and recourse to existing global standards was the best way to implement resolution 1373 (2001). Counter-terrorist measures should be consistent with the rule of law. National systems of justice played a key role in giving effect to the "extradite or prosecute" principle. Suspected terrorists must be brought before properly established and impartial courts and receive fair trials. While no one could guarantee the elimination of international terrorism, the aim of the Security Council in resolution 1373 (2001) was to make the lives and operations of terrorists as difficult as possible. Counter-terrorism efforts would only prevail if they succeeded in destroying the financial, legal and other environments in which terrorists thrived.

18. **The Chairman** agreed that the rule of law must be upheld. The Committee should pursue its activities without undue damage to civil liberties. The meeting would return to that issue during the course of the day.

19. **Mr. Johnston** (International Monetary Fund) said that prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had not focused on the financing of terrorism. However, those attacks and the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) had propelled the issues of countering the financing of terrorism and the related issue of combating money-laundering to the top of the IMF agenda. In November 2001, the International Monetary and Finance Committee of IMF had endorsed an action plan to intensify its efforts in those fields. Under that plan, it had adopted the 40 recommendations on money-laundering and the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing of the Financial Action Task Force on money-laundering (FATF) for use as key standards, had developed a common methodology with FATF to assess compliance with those standards and had stepped up technical assistance to promote compliance.

20. The Committee had asked about experience in developing standards. IMF had intensified its activities in that regard in response to the financial crises of the 1990s, resulting in the adoption of 12 standards, developed either by IMF and World Bank staff or by outside standard-setting bodies, to support surveillance of the international financial system. Since broad consensus was essential, IMF had discussed the standards extensively within its own Executive Board and with other interested bodies and organizations.

21. In promoting international standards among its members, IMF worked through four main channels: the annual article IV consultations with members, periodic financial sector assessments (FSAPs), assessments of offshore financial centres and technical assistance. A new feature of IMF efforts to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism was its recognition of assessments made by FATF and regional FATF bodies that used the agreed methodology in their work. The aim was to prevent duplication of effort, make efficient use of scarce expertise on money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and promote a global standard in dealing with those matters.

22. With regard to the problems which States faced in complying with standards, preliminary assessment of members' compliance with the standards for combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism had found that key weaknesses remained in non-industrialized countries, where the authorities, although they often set compliance with the FATF

recommendations as a priority, were hindered by lack of skills and budgetary resources. The second finding was that some jurisdictions had focused on rule-making to the detriment of implementation, leaving the criminal justice and supervisory systems to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism underdeveloped. The third was that many States lacked the capacity to keep pace with changes in the international legal framework, leaving their implementation incomplete. The fourth finding was that many States needed to strengthen cooperation both domestically and internationally. IMF and the World Bank could help on technical issues, but often a lack of political commitment was a more fundamental constraint on progress.

23. The Committee had asked about actions taken by organizations to ensure member compliance with standards. IMF had had experience in assessing compliance with both legally binding and voluntary standards. The IMF Articles of Association imposed certain legal obligations on members, but the anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) assessments, for example, were voluntary. In both situations IMF relied on a cooperative approach supported by technical assistance. Assessments were treated as a diagnostic tool as a basis for an action plan to address identified weaknesses. Members were encouraged to publish the results of assessments, using a standard IMF format, and the general expectation that the assessment would be published encouraged action by members.

24. In terms of further work on the development of standards, IMF was continuing to collaborate with FATF on the revision of the recommendations on money-laundering and terrorist financing.

25. The Committee had asked for suggestions on how it could help in the development, promotion and monitoring of international standards. IMF was able to share its assessments, with the consent of its members, and would find it useful if the Committee could reciprocate. It would be helpful if the Committee could endorse the international approach adopted by IMF, the World Bank and FATF to apply a common methodology in conducting assessments, and it would be useful to coordinate the coverage and format of questionnaires sent out by different organizations to avoid "assessment fatigue". IMF saw great value in maintaining contact with the Committee through informal consultations on the operational level.

26. **Mr. Crayston** (International Civil Aviation Organization) said that his organization's activities related to counter-terrorism formed part of a wider programme of prevention of and response to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation mandated by the high-level ministerial conference of February 2002 and the resulting aviation security plan of action adopted by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in June 2002.

27. ICAO had had a great deal of experience in setting international standards. Since a plane leaving New York, for example, could be operating almost anywhere in the world the next day, it was essential for aircraft operations to be governed by harmonized international standards. ICAO standards and recommended practices, most of them safety-related, were contained in the 18 annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The standards were developed by an expert group from different States, with industry involvement, then were sent to States for comment and subsequently adopted by the ICAO Council. Those of greatest relevance to counter-terrorism were contained in annex 17 on security.

28. ICAO promoted its standards by developing guidance material and operating some 50 training courses a year. It conducted aviation security audits, shared its findings with the States concerned and provided assistance to rectify deficiencies.

29. The main problems encountered stemmed from a lack of national aviation security programmes or of national legislation giving legal force to the programmes, or from inadequate coordination between relevant authorities. ICAO had a particular problem in that the agencies with which it worked directly, usually the civil aviation authorities or the ministry of transport, were often outranked by the agencies charged with implementation of security measures, such as the police or military. Some States felt that the problem was chiefly financial, but until national legislation, programmes and oversight mechanisms were in place aviation security was unlikely to be fully effective.

30. All ICAO standards were binding, unless a State filed what was termed a "difference" with ICAO, which would then inform all other States that a certain standard was not followed in the particular State. States that did not file differences were presumed to be following ICAO standards, although admittedly it was

not possible to be certain to what extent they were complying. To address that problem, ICAO had begun undertaking audits to determine the status of implementation of certain of the safety-related annexes. Two States had been audited for implementation of annex 17, and another 20 such audits were expected to be completed by the end of 2003, another 40 in 2004 and 40 in each succeeding year. States not meeting the standards would be required to develop action plans to remedy deficiencies.

31. ICAO standards were continuously under review. For instance, the events of 11 September 2001, when aircraft had been used as weapons for the first time, had prompted changes to annex 17. The aviation security panel would soon be considering the issue of the use of surface-to-air missiles against aircraft. Under annex 9 on facilitation, standards were being strengthened on machine-readable travel documents and advance passenger information systems.

32. The Committee might be able to assist ICAO to increase implementation of its standards by delivering a message to States emphasizing the need to comply with ICAO security-related standards and by helping States to obtain funds to remedy deficiencies revealed by ICAO aviation security audits. For its part, ICAO was ready to share its standard-setting experience with the Committee and with participating international, regional and subregional organizations.

33. **The Chairman** reminded the participants that the Committee was not set up to be a direct provider of assistance or funding but rather a provider of ideas and contacts on how Member States might solve their problems and a catalyst to bring others together.

34. **Mr. Mitropoulos** (International Maritime Organization) said that he was pleased to report that in December 2002 the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held at the organization's headquarters in London had adopted new standards for incorporation into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the most important of the many International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions relating to security, along with a new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, both to enter into force on 1 July 2004. According to modest estimates, the standards would apply to some 50,000 ships and 10,000 ports in international trade. Of course, the standards would enhance maritime security only when implemented. IMO was actively assisting member Governments in preparing for implementation of the new measures and reminding them of the consequences if ships flying their flag were found not to be in compliance.

35. IMO devoted significant resources to technical cooperation activities to encourage wider acceptance and implementation of agreed standards. For example, following the events of 11 September 2001, it had allocated substantial funds for regional seminars and workshops on prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism against ships and ports. Problems in meeting standards were sometimes due to a lack of economic or political interest in the regulated areas but more often to a lack of technical and administrative expertise and financial resources. The IMO integrated technical cooperation programme conducted in conjunction with the World Maritime University, the International Maritime Law Institute and the International Maritime Academy had borne fruit in terms of greater implementation. IMO was engaged in a technical cooperation project for capacity-building in developing countries to strengthen their maritime security infrastructure and systems, and the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security had called for the establishment of a maritime security trust fund to provide a dedicated source of financial support for national initiatives in that regard.

36. While IMO itself could not sanction non-compliance, most of the conventions allowed the parties to take action, such as delaying the departure of sub-standard ships until compliance was achieved. IMO also issued non-binding recommendations and guidelines. Further work on standards was needed in the development of guidance for consistent and uniform implementation of agreed standards by national authorities.

37. The Committee could help by impressing upon Member States the need to implement IMO security measures in order to safeguard both their security and trade facilitation interests and by sensitizing potential donor countries to the need to assist developing countries in the implementation of the new requirements and the procurement of physical security equipment. IMO would continue to coordinate its activities with other United Nations programmes and agencies through the Chief Executives Board and to cooperate with the Committee on common goals.

38. **Mr. Lempiainen** (World Customs Organization) said that his organization had over 50 years of experience in promoting cooperation and developing standards in the areas of customs control and facilitation, and more recently in the areas of security and computerization, and several of its instruments were relevant to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The conventions and other instruments of the World Customs Organization (WCO) were developed in collaboration with IMO and other international organizations, including many of those present, and also with international business. For example, the resolution on security and facilitation of the international trade supply chain, which was adopted in June 2002 in response to the increased threat of terrorism, set tasks requiring the collaboration of the entire global customs community, such as determining a standardized set of data elements necessary to identify high-risk goods and establishing the legal basis and procedures for advance electronic transmission of customs data.

39. WCO promoted its standards through brochures, global symposiums and regional and national events and devoted considerable effort to training and technical assistance. One of the immediate challenges it faced was to strike a balance between facilitation and security. Many of its members were developing countries, and there was an ongoing debate within the organization about the importance of physical versus economic security. The longer-term challenges were capacity-building and reform of customs administration and infrastructure. Not all WCO instruments were legally binding; conventions were binding between parties, but WCO recommendations and resolutions were not legally binding on members. However, the political and economic pressure to comply was strong.

40. Work was well advanced on developing instruments on mutual assistance between customs administrations, a framework model for electronic customs communications and risk management guidelines. In the area of security, more work was needed in the short term on an operational model to address the questions of who should share what information with whom along the entire trade supply chain and how and when, which were issues with important economic and political implications. In general, however, the organization was assigning higher priority to implementation and capacity-building than to development of standards.

41. It would be helpful to the World Customs Organization if the Committee could encourage the adoption of WCO instruments relevant to implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee could play a valuable role in maintaining the dialogue on capacity-building and serve as a permanent reporting arrangement.

42. **Mr. Prendergast** (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) said that the Secretary-General, responding to the perceived need, following the events of 11 September 2001, for a broad and sustained strategy to combat terrorism, had created the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, combining the expertise available within key agencies, programmes and departments with the input of independent specialists. The Policy Working Group had decided to focus its work on three key areas: dissuasion, denial and cooperation.

43. First, it had considered ways to dissuade would-be-perpetrators of terrorist acts through effective norm-setting and the implementation of pertinent international legal instruments, an active public information campaign and the promotion of international consensus in support of the fight against terrorism. The United Nations system was promoting the ratification and entry into force of conventions related to counter-terrorism, particularly through the provision of legal and technical advice. The Office of the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Public Information were working to ensure that the United Nations was projecting a principled message on the unacceptability of terrorism while stressing the need to address the threat through international cooperation, to ensure respect for human rights in counter-terrorism efforts and to find political solutions to disputes and conflicts.

44. The Policy Working Group had proposed ways to deny terrorists opportunities to commit acts of terrorism, namely, by supporting the monitoring efforts of the Committee; by strengthening global norms against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; by providing technical and expert support to States seeking to curb the flow of arms, funds and technology to terrorist cells; and by redoubling efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts that could become breeding grounds for terrorism.

45. On the score of cooperation, it had considered ways to encourage subregional, regional and global

organizations to join forces in a common campaign. It was clear that a threat as complex as international terrorism demanded sustained joint efforts. The Secretary-General would be including the theme on the agenda of his upcoming summer meeting with the heads of regional organizations.

46. **The Chairman** said that those involved in counter-terrorism efforts should be aware that they were promoting an activity that could potentially come into conflict with other standards, such as human rights, that were equally binding on Member States. It would be useful to hear later from some of the legal organizations present in that regard.

47. **Mr. Schmoll** (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering), describing his organization's experience in producing international standards, primarily the 40 recommendations on money-laundering published in 1990 and currently under review and the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing formulated after 11 September 2001, said that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) used political engagement to encourage countries to adopt such recommendations and evaluated the extent of implementation among FATF members. FATF encouraged non-members to adopt recommendations through FATF-style regional bodies and also worked with individual countries that found it difficult to bring their practices into line with international standards.

48. One challenge faced by FATF was how to publicize its standards, although some success had been achieved through regional groups, consistent attendance at relevant meetings and use of the Internet. The other main problem was to ensure sound interpretation of the FATF standards. Two interpretative notes and a best-practices paper had therefore been produced on the eight special recommendations. Interpretation of recommendations clearly required further attention, and additional interpretation guidelines would be presented at a forthcoming FATF meeting. He hoped that the Counter-Terrorism Committee could work even more closely with FATF and regional bodies so that the resulting exchange of information and experience could be used to shape their respective standards.

49. **Mr. Laborde** (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) said that ratification of the international conventions on terrorism was not sufficient; the main criminalization provisions needed to be embodied in Member States' penal codes. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) had produced a legislative guide to the universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, soon to appear in a revised version. UNODC had also updated its manual on United Nations model treaties on extradition and on mutual assistance in criminal matters, and had produced legislative guides on implementing the international instruments on combating drugs and transnational organized crime, which served as a useful complement to counter-terrorism instruments.

50. **Ms. Nilsson** (International Atomic Energy Agency) said that, after 45 years' experience with nuclear safety standards, her organization had broadened its mission to include nuclear security, with the goal of preventing nuclear or radioactive material from being used in weapons of mass destruction. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had found that establishing and developing security standards was more challenging than working with safety standards, partly as a result of the need to work with law-enforcement and customs agencies in addition to nuclear authorities. In areas that touched on national security, it was vital for an international organization to find the right role for itself and the right ways of approaching cooperation with member States and other organizations. It was also important to ensure the confidentiality of shared sensitive information.

51. Standards were useless unless applied, especially in developing countries. The IAEA Director General and Board of Governors had approved a plan of action to provide member States with legislative assistance and training. The programme would be financed through member States' voluntary contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund. IAEA would continue to work with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and other organizations to implement its programme of action in a way that avoided duplication and made best use of available resources.

52. **Mr. Sourvanos** (Council of the European Union) said that the Council's Committee on Terrorism regularly reviewed the 12 international conventions on terrorism and advised Member States on how to use executive machinery for the suppression of terrorism. The Committee focused on strengthening capacity in the areas of police, intelligence, customs, border controls and weapons access and on providing bilateral assistance (including to non-European Union countries).

53. **Mr. Trapp** (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) said that his organization was concerned with national implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which was soon to be reviewed at a conference of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. He echoed the calls for increased cooperation and reduction of duplication, especially important for small countries with few resources.

54. **Mr. Florent** (France) explained that the Counter-Terrorism Committee was at the stage of checking whether Member States had introduced legislation to enforce resolution 1373 (2001), and whether such legislation was being implemented with the requisite human and technical resources. With reference to what the FATF and ICAO representatives had said about verifying Member States' compliance with their standards, he wondered whether the Committee could have access to the results of such assessments.

55. **The Chairman** said that a balance had to be struck between confidentiality and the transparent promotion of global standards.

The meeting was suspended at 11.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

56. **Ms. Kohonen** (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) said that the three areas in which human rights concerns intersected with terrorism were human rights violations as a result of terrorism, human rights violations as a cause of terrorism and respect for the human rights framework in the fight against terrorism. In the latter area the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had a particular responsibility and could add value to the counter-terrorism debate. OHCHR applied the framework provided by the almost universally ratified human rights instruments and standards to both terrorist acts and counter-terrorist efforts. Compliance with the relevant conventions was assessed by treaty-monitoring bodies, and cases of human rights violations, such as prolonged incommunicado detention, restrictions on the media or on freedom of speech and extensions of the powers of law-enforcement officials, were investigated by special rapporteurs. The Human Rights Committee had adopted General Comment No. 29 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11), which defined the parameters of a state of emergency and advised Governments on the powers and limitations that applied in such cases.

57. OHCHR had briefed the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and had prepared a further guidance note on compliance with international human rights standards to assist Member States in their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). That note was available on the Committee's web site, and Member States should refer to it when reporting to the Committee. OHCHR could also provide technical assistance to Member States either at their request or upon referral by the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Assistance would include providing technical advice on revising legislation on states of emergency and training of law-enforcement or legal officials.

58. She was pleased to note such productive examples of cooperation as the Assistance Expert's intention to address the Human Rights Committee in Geneva, and the Human Rights Committee's plan to brief the Counter-Terrorism Committee on how General Comment No. 29 applied to the latter's work.

59. **The Chairman** stated that, while the Counter-Terrorism Committee was careful not to ask Member States to do anything that would violate human rights in their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), it was not the Committee's task to monitor compliance with human rights obligations. There was a clear understanding between the Committee and the human rights bodies about their respective roles, and he hoped they could continue to work closely together.

60. **Mr. Everts** (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) said that his organization felt that regional organizations should play a supportive role, and interpreted that to mean that it should encourage its 55 participating States to comply with international standards. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) therefore attempted to create political commitment and devise ways of assisting States in the adoption and implementation of standards. An OSCE Ministerial Council had recently adopted a Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism. OSCE had achieved considerable success in its support role, since 40 per cent of its participating States were parties to all 12 international conventions on terrorism and 90 per cent had made some form of pledge to engage in international commitments.

61. In addition to international standards, OSCE concerned itself with regional standards and codes of conduct on the political and military aspects of security. OSCE was also working on a recommendation on the production of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Such standards, once accepted, were regularly reviewed in terms of practical implementation by the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna or the Forum for Security Cooperation, which had recently been tasked with the review of counter-terrorism issues. The first OSCE annual security review conference would be held during 2003 to assess what had been achieved and what remained to be done.

62. **Mr. de Vel** (Council of Europe) underlined the irreversible commitment of the Council of Europe to the rule of law and the preservation of fundamental rights and freedoms while engaging in the fight against terrorism, based on its 50 years of experience in protecting human rights while combating international crime. Its Committee of Ministers had adopted guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism, specifying the limits imposed by international human rights instruments and the European Court of Human Rights.

63. The programme of action to combat terrorism had three elements: strengthening the legal framework against terrorism, safeguarding fundamental values, and attacking the root causes of terror. To strengthen the legal framework, the Council had called on its members to ratify all international and European conventions on terrorism, which had shown results, including the withdrawal of reservations to conventions by some Governments and the strengthening of extradition and mutual assistance treaties. Its efforts to safeguard fundamental values had resulted in the adoption of the guidelines on human rights and terrorism. A draft protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism limited the political exception to extradition and provided for a follow-up mechanism. Another instrument on the protection of witnesses was also under preparation.

64. Combating the financing of terrorism was also a priority, and the Council's monetary committee was looking at the question of money-laundering in cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force. It provided assistance to States mainly in the area of drafting anti-terror legislation that also upheld fundamental human rights. It had recently held a tripartite meeting with the European Union and the United Nations in that area as well, and its work was open to observer countries.

Role of regional and subregional organizations in strengthening global counter-terrorism capacity

65. **Ms. Brizuela de Avila** (Organization of American States), speaking in her capacity as Chair of the Inter-American Committee on Counter-Terrorism (CICTE), said that regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) had a strategic role to play in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Her Committee was made up of representatives of all States members of OAS and was responsible for policy coordination among members in fighting terrorism and for setting up the plan of work in that area. The Committee coordinated its efforts with other OAS committees on financing of terrorism, drug trafficking and illicit arms trade, as well as the Human Rights Committee.

66. With regard to the role the Committee had played in encouraging OAS member States to meet international and regional standards, it had given impetus to the adoption of the Declaration of San Salvador on combating terrorism and to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which established a common legal foundation on which member States could base national legislation with unified criteria and procedures. It had also developed model laws and self-evaluation guides based on international standards to help disseminate information on available resources.

67. As she saw it, the role of subregional and regional organizations in promoting practical cooperation was to provide a forum for an exchange of information on best practices; identify opportunities for training and build a network of counter-terrorism experts; develop a communications network; provide training for border, customs and immigration officials; and promote technological support for common standards. One of the lessons learned thus far was that national contact points must be identified and understandings reached on their responsibilities, both within Governments and among the regional groups. A habit of regular communication must be developed within the counter-terrorism community. The advantage of discussing terrorism at the regional level was that a sense of common ground was created which facilitated the exchange of information at political and technical levels.

68. As for structures needed in regional and subregional organizations to promote an effective and practical discussion of counter-terrorism issues, in the experience of CICTE the establishment of its own secretariat with OAS had been crucial in allowing it to establish points of contact in member States for the exchange of information on best practices and maintain a database of available resources, national authorities, procedural manuals and directories of national legislation. The political bodies of a regional organization should be kept informed of the work of such a secretariat.

69. The current meeting was an excellent example of the ways in which the Counter-Terrorism Committee could support the activities of regional and subregional organizations. Its role as a forum for exchange of information and experience would certainly enhance future cooperation. . It could take advantage of communications technology to provide secure exchanges of information. The Committee could also develop a reporting method that would extract vital information and facilitate analysis and comparison.

70. OAS had made an integrated response to terrorism at the political, legal and technical levels, the latter represented by CICTE and its secretariat. It stood ready to work with other regional organizations in that fight.

71. **The Chairman** said that OAS was in advance of many regional organizations in its response to the requirements of the Committee, and he was certain that it would be willing to share experiences and best practices.

72. **Mr. Ward** (Assistance Expert, Counter-Terrorism Committee) said that all States should have a strong interest in seeing that their neighbours had in place a platform for combating terrorism and in preventing their territories from being used, directly or indirectly, in support of terrorism. States in all regions were recognizing that no country was safe from terrorism if its neighbour was not. The impact of an act of terrorism could be just as great on a neighbouring State as on the target State. It followed, therefore that each State in a region or subregion had a vested interest in seeing that compliance with Security Council resolutions was achieved across the region. There might be wide variations in the capacity of States within a region to implement the resolution, and thus regional and subregional organizations had an important role to play to ensure that no gaps were left within their territory.

73. Some regional organizations had developed and were implementing action plans aimed at promoting full implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) in their respective regions, while others were falling behind. Those regional organizations should take appropriate action to ensure that each State had the requisite legislative framework against terrorism and the means to implement it. Any organization lacking the capacity to assume that role was obliged to seek assistance to enhance its capability to fulfil that responsibility.

74. Regional and subregional organizations provided an important forum for members to discuss and initiate action and could play a significant role in achieving greater coherence in regional capacity-building, higher standards of implementation by setting minimum acceptable standards, training for relevant actors and exchange of expertise for greater uniformity, better coordination among neighbouring States and greater communication and exchange of information. They could also help to tailor assistance to the needs of their members and facilitate assistance among States within the region. Each organization could provide a forum for sharing of best practices.

75. States in some regions had been working together in practical ways to improve regional capacity against terrorism. Some had established a technical body to carry out that important task, and those which had not done so should give it consideration. Such a technical body could be tasked with implementing decisions related to suppression of terrorism taken at the political level and following up with member States on their implementation, coordinating regional initiatives, keeping members informed of their obligations and the relevant international and regional standards and developing points of contact within each region with the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The current meeting provided an opportunity to share experience in those areas.

76. The Ministerial Declaration in the annex to Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) called on regional and subregional organizations to work with the Committee and other international organizations to facilitate sharing of best practice against terrorism and to assist their members in fulfilling their obligation to combat terrorism. It was important to broaden the

contacts between the Committee and regional organizations, and for those organizations to play an active coordination role in facilitating cooperation between States on counter-terrorism matters in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. More and more organizations were looking at what they had to offer in countering terrorism and informing the Committee of their willingness to help. That they were building their capacity to counter terrorism in all its forms was a new process of engagement by those organizations and a reflection of their seriousness and determination.

77. **The Chairman** said that all countries and regional organizations needed the will to act, the knowledge of how to act and the necessary machinery, leading up to action itself. He hoped that regional organizations would hold their own follow-up meeting on those issues.

78. **Ms. Mahlangu** (Inter-Parliamentary Union) said that the Union's action in combating terrorism was based on its firm belief that terrorism undermined democracy and human rights, the cornerstones of world peace and security. The Inter-Parliamentary Union had always condemned all forms and acts of terrorism and fully supported United Nations measures to combat it, particularly Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Parliaments had a crucial role to play in combating terrorism. They established the legal framework for the implementation of counter-terrorism measures at both the national and international levels. In that connection, the Inter-Parliamentary Union encouraged its members to ensure the ratification of the relevant international instruments, their incorporation into the body of national legislation and their effective implementation and to report regularly on their activities in that regard.

79. Through its technical cooperation programme, the Union helped parliaments to strengthen their law-making and oversight capacities and organized awareness programmes on the manifestations and consequences of terrorism, the importance of the relevant international instruments and ways and means of ensuring government compliance with their provisions. The Inter-Parliamentary Union addressed some of the root causes of terrorism by promoting a culture of democracy and human rights and was committed to ensuring more effective monitoring of parliamentary action to combat terrorism.

80. **Mr. Abbas** (League of Arab States) said that, as part of the follow-up to resolution 1373 (2001), the League had taken many steps to combat international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It was pursuing its efforts to strengthen cooperation in judicial and security matters among its member States as a party to the 1988 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism and, in that context, had held a number of symposiums on terrorism, money-laundering and implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Since the Arab States participated actively in the initiatives of both the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League to combat international terrorism, a panel of Arab experts had been established to consider resolution 1373 (2001) and submit recommendations on it. The secretariat of the League of Arab States was making every effort to strengthen coordination of its activities with those of the Counter-Terrorism Committee

81. The League was cooperating with all other States in the pursuit, arrest, extradition and prosecution of terrorists in the spirit of the draft comprehensive convention against international terrorism. The draft convention should include a specific definition of terrorism and distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate rights of people to resist foreign occupation. While the League of Arab States condemned terrorism in all its forms, regardless of its religious, ethnic or national links, it believed that counter-terrorism efforts must respect individual and collective freedoms in accordance with religious values, the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and human rights treaties. Lastly, he called for an end to the arbitrary and selective stigmatizing of Arab and Muslim citizens by the United States of America and Western countries, and for addressing the root causes of terrorism through dialogue among different cultures and civilizations.

82. **Mr. Kebe** (African Union) said that the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of the Organization of African Unity had pre-dated the events of 11 September 2001 by nearly two years. Immediately after the terrorist attack on the United States of America, the African Union had held a meeting in Dakar and another in Algiers with a view to "Africanizing" the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). By 6 December 2002, however, only 18 out of 53 countries had ratified the Organization of African

Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, prompting the secretariat of the African Union to establish a structure to promote accession to and ratification of the instrument. There were also other difficulties that hindered its implementation, for instance, in convincing countries that, whether or not they were directly affected by the threat of terrorism, they could suffer its indirect consequences by being used as transit States or staging areas for terrorist actions, or in promoting counter-terrorism as a high priority in countries trying to cope with very basic development issues in all sectors, including health, education and employment. The most effective approach to enhancing counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa might be to incorporate them within the overall framework of development and to provide needed assistance to that end.

83. **Mr. Milintachinda** (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) said that, at its annual October meeting following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) had issued a statement on fighting terrorism which included a commitment to support the global fight against terrorism and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). That commitment had been further strengthened at the annual meeting held in October 2002 in Mexico following the terrorist bombing in Bali and incidents in other APEC economies. The 2002 statement on fighting terrorism and promoting growth contained, inter alia, a timetable for member economies to take action to secure the movement of goods and people, check financial flows to terrorist organizations and promote cybersecurity. Since that time, APEC, which included many of the world's largest ports and busiest airports, had further strengthened its security measures, particularly through its Counter-Terrorism Action Plan designed to strengthen member economies' capacity to protect cargo and passengers in international shipping and aviation, secure energy supplies and protect the health of their populations.

84. Referring to the question about structures, he said that APEC had established a counter-terrorism task force to coordinate the implementation of its October 2002 statement on fighting terrorism, assist member States to assess their counter-terrorism needs, support capacity-building and provide technical assistance, including through consultation with the international financial institutions. As its membership represented a broad range of cultures and economic levels, APEC had diverse strengths and potentialities for cooperation with international organizations. Currently, it cooperated with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Its action plan called for strengthened cooperation among its various counter-terrorism working groups and committees.

85. With regard to the question about how the Counter-Terrorism Committee could support regional efforts, he proposed establishing a link between the APEC and Counter-Terrorism Committee web sites, since the APEC web site contained substantial information on counter-terrorism measures and on simultaneously boosting security and trade. Two weeks earlier, a meeting co-hosted by APEC, the United States of America and Thailand had brought together representatives of government agencies and companies at the Secure Trade in the APEC Region Conference (STAR). The conference had stressed the need for new partnerships between government and business and, in general, greater coordination between public and private entities at both the national and international levels in the fight against terrorism.

86. **Mr. Zugic** (South-East European Cooperation Process) said that counter-terrorism should be interpreted very broadly as encompassing such issues as organized crime, illicit trafficking and money-laundering, which threatened the security of societies. The Ministers of the Interior of the members of the South-East European Cooperation Process met regularly to debate very concrete issues, such as border control and judicial measures. He stressed the importance of avoiding duplication by establishing a very clear division of labour between the work of regional and subregional organizations. The South-East European Cooperation Process stood ready to share information and provide assistance to other organizations.

87. **Mr. McNamara** (United States of America), speaking as a member of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, stressed the importance of earlier remarks by the representative of France concerning the need to avoid duplication. He also welcomed the Chairman's outline of parameters for cooperation by regional and subregional organizations with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (will, knowledge, machinery and action).

Indeed, any information provided to the Committee by regional and subregional organizations would facilitate and sharpen its capacity to evaluate their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee would greatly appreciate copies of action plans, as well as information on how they were being implemented, the kind of assistance regional and subregional organizations could offer and the extent to which they felt they had the potential to implement counter-terrorism measures or were implementing them in practice, along the lines of the OAS Matrix and initiatives being taken by other organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). A description of counter-terrorism mechanisms, including their structure, mandate and budgetary allocations, and a progress report on their work, would also be extremely helpful.

88. **The Chairman** noted that, under the role of regional organizations, the checklist also stressed the sharing of information. Regional and subregional organizations should exchange information packets and models for launching counter-terrorism mechanisms and keep the Counter-Terrorism Committee regularly informed of their timetables for implementing counter-terrorism measures and the results achieved.

The meeting was suspended at 1.10 p.m.

United Nations S/AC.40/SR.57/Add.1

Security Council

Provisional
Distr.: General
21 March 2003

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

Provisional summary record of the second part* of the 57th meeting
Held at headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 March 2003, at 2.30 p.m.

Chairman: Sir Jeremy Greenstock ..... (United Kingdom)

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The meeting was reconvened at 2.35 p.m.

Special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations

Role of regional and subregional organizations in strengthening global counter-terrorism capacity (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Selat** (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) said that the Association encouraged compliance with international standards among its member countries, including in the field of counter-terrorism and within the framework of its free trade arrangement. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had issued several political declarations relating to counter-terrorism, including jointly with the United States of America, the European Union and China. Terrorism was seen as a challenge to the realization of the ASEAN Vision 2020 and to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity in the subregion.

2. Practical discussion of counter-terrorism issues at the subregional level was based on the Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, which also covered piracy, money-laundering, cybercrime, illegal drug-trafficking and arms smuggling. The Work Programme was implemented through information exchange, cooperation in legal and law-enforcement matters, institutional capacity-building, training and extra-regional cooperation. Mechanisms also existed for monitoring progress, identifying new practical initiatives and approving regional capacity-building that avoided duplication. An ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime was held on an annual basis, involving senior officials in the areas of transport, customs, finance, narcotic drugs and law enforcement, and an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime was convened every two years, or as required. ASEAN also sought to promote ratification by its member countries of relevant conventions. At the international level, ASEAN was keen to exchange information on the detection and deterrence of the use of biological agents and other materials of mass destruction, as well as technologies for combating cybercrime. It would also particularly appreciate assistance in developing a regional convention to combat terrorism and promoting implementation of existing international treaties, particularly by newer member countries. ASEAN was also in the process of establishing a comprehensive database of treaties on transnational crime and terrorism.

3. **Mr. Simancas Carrion** (European Police Office) said that the European Police Office (Europol), as the European Union's law-enforcement organization, was mainly operational in nature. However it also possessed considerable analytical capacity, and generated strategic reports and threat assessments for use by its member countries. The Europol terrorism task force, established by the Council of the European Union (Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs) in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, had demonstrated the value of sharing information between national police services. Key priorities for Europol included combating the financing of terrorism and developing common tools for use within the European Union. Such tools could easily be replicated for use in other regions.

4. No reference had yet been made to the victims of terrorism, of whom there was no direct mention in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Terrorists had a purely utilitarian attitude towards victims, whom they merely used to exert pressure on Governments; Governments for their part had an obligation to ensure the security and protect the human rights of victims, including persons whose freedoms were restricted by terrorism. Europol had established some cooperation agreements with other organizations, specifically relating to victims. Upon his return to Europol headquarters, he would promote new cooperation agreements with other relevant organizations participating in the special meeting. Europol was entirely at the service of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for follow-up activities.

5. **Ms. Prost** (Commonwealth Secretariat) said that as an interregional organization with very limited resources at its disposal, the Commonwealth Secretariat was forced to focus on those areas in which it had a comparative advantage. In the area of counter-terrorism, it provided practical support to its member countries for the domestic implementation of international legal standards and had designed special tools to that end. Dialogue at the interregional level focused on the difficulties being experienced by countries in implementing those standards, the aim being to support rather than complicate domestic processes. Since many member countries had little or no access to information technology, the

Commonwealth Secretariat also played an important role in disseminating information in the form of annual bulletins. A ministerial committee on counter-terrorism met once a year, while the operational structure for counter-terrorism consisted of a committee of four persons, including one contact person. Although not elaborate, such a structure allowed for communication with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and had proved effective in relaying information to member countries. The work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee was invaluable, enabling organizations such as her own to avoid duplication and learn from each other's experiences.

6. **The Chairman** said that the experience of the Commonwealth Secretariat showed that much could be achieved with a modest structure. Even the Counter-Terrorism Committee did not have many people in its operational arm. Only one or two people were necessary to engage in the sort of international liaison necessary to bring a meeting such as the current one into being.

7. **Mr. Hirsch** (International Peace Academy) said that the special meeting highlighted not only the importance of sharing technical information but also the need for frank and open discussion of the social, economic and political difficulties still being encountered in the counter-terrorism field, including by the Counter-Terrorism Committee itself.

8. The International Peace Academy was a policy research organization which sought, inter alia, to help the United Nations link its peace and security agenda with its development agenda. "Learning lessons" was not just a technical matter. It also required an open and realistic assessment and frank discussion of the competing priorities and trade-offs between counter-terrorism and issues such as human rights and free trade, as well as the political and economic interests of Member States. There was also a need for better understanding, both within and among international and regional organizations, of comparative advantages. The Committee's assessments, for their part, should be viewed as a diagnostic tool for recognizing shortcomings and limitations, not for criticizing individual States. Lateral exchanges between regional organizations were also vital, and the initiative of the representative of the Organization of American States (OAS) was most welcome in that regard.

9. It was also vital to bridge the perceptual gaps between the developed and developing worlds on counter-terrorism and related issues. That had been one of the aims of the conference held by the International Peace Academy in October 2002, entitled "Responding to Terrorism: What role for the United Nations?" Participants from the developing world had urged the United Nations to adopt a holistic approach to counter-terrorism that integrated responsiveness to the perceived and actual grievances of peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America with the post-11 September 2001 security agenda. The Counter-Terrorism Committee should take full account of that aspect in its ongoing work.

10. **The Chairman** said that the International Peace Academy was the intellectual conscience of the United Nations and urged it to continue its cooperation.

Role of international and regional organizations on assistance

11. **The Chairman** said that the Counter-Terrorism Committee was attempting to facilitate the provision of counter-terrorism assistance to Member States for capacity-building, including by preparing a matrix of global requests which reflected the assistance needs identified through the Committee's implementation monitoring process. The Committee recognized that States were experiencing difficulty in making counter-terrorism a priority against other competing priorities.

12. **Ms. Waxman** (World Bank) said that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been working with increased intensity on joint projects since the events of 11 September 2001. They had a competitive edge in the provision of technical assistance to countries, applicable also to the field of counter-terrorism. The Bretton Woods institutions not only conducted in-depth assessments of countries' compliance with international standards, but also had staff in most countries who were well versed in the country's history, culture, economy and aspirations. The World Bank and IMF also enjoyed long-established partnerships with other organizations at the international, multi-regional, regional and subregional levels and held regular meetings with them. They had devised a joint action plan for regular follow-up of country assessments, which enabled them to identify country needs and help Governments develop sequenced action plans of their own. The World Bank and IMF also ensured that the funding issue was

incorporated into annual assistance strategies. While providing short-term funding, they were also active in locating longer-term mentors.

13. In addition to their regional and subregional outreach projects, the World Bank and IMF had also held global, interactive videoconferences, as an inexpensive way of involving high-level policy-makers. Regional and subregional conferences had also been convened with a focus on sharing experiences and best practices to combat money-laundering and terrorism. The Bank's subregional workshops had focused, inter alia, on establishing financial intelligence units with the assistance of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies. The World Bank had also produced a "desk guide", available in both electronic and paper format and updated regularly, on international codes, organizational contacts, international and regional bodies, legal, regulatory and institutional objectives and potential sources of assistance. A global technical assistance clearing-house database had also been developed jointly with other organizations, which detailed assistance requirements and attempted — although with some difficulty — to track the delivery of technical assistance. Thus far, 371 assistance requests had been received from countries in the areas of legal infrastructure, laws and regulations, training for the judiciary and law-enforcement personnel, capacity-building, institutional strengthening, codes of practice, operational advice, private-sector involvement and equipment. The World Bank hoped to share its valuable experience in developing databases with other participants. The Counter-Terrorism Committee could use its leadership role to encourage other organizations, especially the FATF-style regional bodies, to help fill the geographical lacunae in the database, particularly in respect of sources of technical assistance for countries in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

14. The Committee might consider holding meetings at the regional level, starting with Africa, with the African Union as contact point, to build strong regional capacity for providing technical assistance and relaying information on assistance needs. The Bretton Woods institutions would be particularly keen to support a meeting that emphasized the links between terrorism and development, in particular the impact of terrorism on the poor.

15. **Mr. Valenzuela Marzo** (European Commission) said that European Union efforts to combat terrorism were based on an action plan adopted on 21 September 2001. The plan focused on the enhancement of cooperation and coordination among member States and on the provision of assistance to non-members.

16. It had become clear when the Union had reviewed its counter-terrorism activities that many of its existing initiatives, although not categorized as anti-terrorism measures, were making a valuable contribution to efforts in that area. Such initiatives included the integration of border and customs management, training of police officers and members of the judiciary and capacity-building in financial administration. The Union was now seeking to mainstream counter-terrorism into its regular cooperation activities with developing countries. One of the lessons learned from such cooperation was the importance of assisting partners not only in developing standards and best practices but also in implementing them.

17. In July 2002, the Council of Ministers had identified, in consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee, a small group of countries in which the Union would implement a number of specific counter-terrorism initiatives. In considering what assistance to provide, the Council of Ministers had taken into account the relevance of the initiatives to the fight against terrorism and to the Union's foreign policy, the willingness of the countries concerned to work with the Union and the existence of a European Union comparative advantage. In that connection, he emphasized the need for technical assistance providers to play to their strengths.

18. The Union was committed to working with other regional organizations to help them build capacity for the efficient delivery of technical assistance in combating terrorism. In order to expand their assistance activities, regional organizations needed up-to-date information on the needs of partner countries and organizations, the actions of other donors, and the existence of coordination mechanisms. The Counter-Terrorism Committee had an important role to play as a repository for such information, although the possibility of devolving some of its responsibilities to regional organizations should be explored further.

19. Lastly, he underscored that, while new initiatives were more eye-catching, the dividends from building counter-terrorism elements into existing programmes would likely be greater over the long term. In that connection, it was important not to lose sight of the

bigger picture, in particular, the challenges represented by the millennium development goals.

20. **Mr. Ward** (Assistance Expert, Counter-Terrorism Committee) said that the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) was a major undertaking for many States, particularly those with limited capacities and resources. Based on the reports received by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, drafting of legislation had been identified as a primary area of need for most States, with the deficiencies being most acute in counter-terrorism law and in banking and financial law and regulations. Many States also needed help in drafting appropriate legislation for the implementation of the 12 international instruments for the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Most lacked experience in counter-terrorism, particularly in combating the financing of terrorism, and a large number needed to build capacity in their institutional mechanisms to support the legislative framework.

21. In the first phase of its work, the Committee had focused on ensuring that all States had in place legislation covering all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001), that they had taken steps to become parties to the 12 international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and that they had established effective machinery for countering terrorist financing. In resolution 1377 (2001), the Security Council recognized that many States would require assistance in implementing all the requirements of resolution 1373 (2001) and invited States to inform the Counter-Terrorism Committee of areas in which they required such support. The Committee had explored with international, regional and subregional organizations the promotion of best practices in the areas covered by resolution 1373 (2001); the availability of existing technical, financial, regulatory, legislative or other assistance programmes that might facilitate the implementation of the resolution; and the development of possible synergies between those programmes.

22. Thus far, 108 States had requested assistance from the Committee or were receiving help directly from assistance providers, as shown in the matrix of requests for assistance and responses, which had been distributed informally. The need for assistance was becoming more obvious as more States reached a clearer understanding of what was expected of them. Regrettably, many of the States most in need of assistance had yet to request it, and he urged regional and subregional organizations to facilitate that process.

23. The Committee was seeking to facilitate self-help by making available information on standards and best practices and by establishing a directory of counter-terrorism information and sources of assistance, which could be accessed on its web site. The Committee was also encouraging donors to respond to the assistance needs identified as priorities for each State. Those needs, which were reflected in the matrix, were determined on the basis of the evaluation of the reports submitted by States and through consultations between the Committee's Technical Assistance team and individual States. The Committee was working with regional and sectoral organizations to tackle shortcomings that fell within their areas of competence, and to promote capacity-building within those organizations to enable them to respond to States' needs. The mention in the matrix of the assistance already being provided enabled potential donors to target their assistance programmes appropriately and avoid duplication and overlapping. Of course, it was also important to ensure that no gaps remained. While the Committee's Technical Assistance Team was the focal point for that process, the Committee itself did not provide technical assistance but facilitated its delivery.

24. Regional and subregional organizations, too, had an important role to play as vehicles through which region-wide technical assistance programmes could be developed and implemented. They enjoyed a number of advantages, including their affinity with local cultures, their understanding of their members' needs and their ability to leverage scarce assistance resources. He therefore wished to encourage all organizations that had a contribution to make to become fully engaged in providing technical assistance.

25. **Mr. Wilson** (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force) said that the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), established in 1992, had considerable experience of monitoring compliance with international standards by its 29 members through its confidential mutual evaluation programme. A number of CFATF members had not only enacted effective anti-money-laundering legislation but were actively enforcing it, providing an example for others to follow. In order to achieve greater transparency the CFATF ministers had agreed to the publication of an annual report on the status of members' infrastructure for combating money-laundering and terrorist financing.

26. CFATF had given guidance to the recently established FATF-style regional body in eastern and southern Africa and was cooperating actively with the South American Financial Action Group. It would be ready to provide assistance with the development of a starter pack on establishing regional dialogue on adherence to international standards and to organize joint meetings and training initiatives with other regional bodies. It was currently developing a matrix of its members' technical assistance and training needs and was working with global partners to ensure that those needs were met.

27. Regrettably, some countries lacked both the financial and human resources to become full partners in the fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing. Implementation of new initiatives in such areas as international financial services was proving costly and burdensome for Governments in the Caribbean region; there was also tremendous pressure on the secretariats of FATF-style regional bodies. While the donor community had been generous, more assistance was needed. Donors should focus on sustainable long-term efforts, so that the recent gains made in strengthening structures against transnational organized crime and terrorism would not be completely undermined by the vast resources and increasing sophistication of criminal groups. Close coordination between donors and regional bodies was necessary to ensure that States took full advantage of the abundance of assistance available.

28. Lastly, noting that strong anti-money-laundering measures were essential for combating terrorist financing and that the 40 recommendations of FATF were not legally binding, he called for the elaboration of a United Nations convention against money-laundering.

29. **Mr. Gunaydin** (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative) said that, in 1999, the 11 members of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) had signed the Agreement on Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Transborder Crime, which provided for cooperation among the region's police and customs authorities. In 2000, the SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime had been established in Bucharest, Romania. The Center, which was staffed by 19 liaison officers from 12 member States, had assisted with more than 3,000 criminal investigations, and many cases had been solved as a result of joint operations it had coordinated.

30. On 14 September 2001, the SECI Joint Cooperation Committee had adopted the Bucharest Declaration on the Suppression of Terrorism, which was aimed at promoting the exchange of information on criminal organizations with links to terrorism and sources of financing. In addition, the SECI Center had established a working group to provide assistance to the United States Government in identifying and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In October 2001, the working group had disseminated a watch list containing some 300 names among the countries of south-east Europe. As a result, suspicious bank accounts and transactions had been detected in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey. The working group also provided information on the movement of refugees and illegal migrants from conflict areas in south-east Europe and assisted SECI member States in developing counter-terrorism strategies.

31. A regional workshop on terrorism held in July 2002 had led to the adoption of a two-pronged approach to combating terrorism involving both legislative reform and joint operations. A counter-terrorism task force was to be established within the SECI Center as the focal point for the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and other relevant international instruments. The Center was also engaged in efforts to combat the traffic in small arms and light weapons and chemical, biological and nuclear materials.

32. **Mr. Salah** (Islamic Development Bank) said that, as a multilateral development institution, the Islamic Development Bank stood ready to assist member countries in increasing their capacity to meet international standards on combating money-laundering and terrorist financing. The Bank was able both to provide and to finance technical assistance programmes. Given the importance of avoiding duplication of effort, it would strongly support the establishment of a coordination mechanism consisting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and international and multilateral development institutions.

33. **Mr. Hajbosseini** (Organization of the Islamic Conference) said that the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an interregional organization with members in Africa, Asia and South America, was committed to the fight against terrorism. In 2002, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers had adopted

the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, whereby it had established an open-ended ministerial-level committee on international terrorism. On 31 March 2003, a meeting of experts would be held in Algiers to prepare a plan of action on combating terrorism.

34. The Chairman commended the way in which the Islamic States were working together in the fight against terrorism despite the related political problems which particularly affected those States.

35. **Mr. Lemay** (Global Programme against Money Laundering) said that the infrastructure needed for combating money-laundering included criminalization, financial record-keeping, transaction reporting and financial intelligence units. The Global Programme against Money Laundering of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime had learned from experience that partnership in the delivery of technical assistance was highly desirable and was applying that approach in its collaborative efforts with partners, including international organizations and bilateral providers.

36. The Programme had found that, although traditional short-term training activities such as workshops could be effective, there was a need for long-term direct delivery of expertise and experience, particularly in the developing countries, through mentoring, which involved putting people in the field for six months or more to build capacity at the country level. Efforts were also under way to develop interactive computer-based training: a basic anti-money-laundering computer training module for law enforcement would shortly be available and other modules would soon follow. Such training could reach thousands of people at very low cost, and its delivery and results could be tracked.

37. The desirability of feedback from assistance providers to the Committee and to donors was becoming increasingly apparent. A good example was the need to help States to deal with various problems in relation to foreign financial assets which they had seized or frozen pursuant to Security Council resolutions. The Programme had been working extensively with the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). That Group had asked him to make it known that it had every intention of participating actively in efforts to combat the financing of terrorism.

38. In response to a question from the Chairman, he said that the Programme's activities were constrained by the staffing available. However, teams for particular missions usually included experts loaned to the Programme by Member States or occasionally by other organizations or the private sector. The Programme also conducted joint missions with the Global Programme against Terrorism.

39. **Mr. Iskandarov** (Working Group on Counter-Terrorism of the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) Group) said that the members of the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) Group were eager to combat terrorism, which had affected all five countries by dealing with its root causes and strengthening their counter terrorist activities through constant exchanges of information, proactive cooperation with relevant international bodies, harmonization of national legislation with international legal instruments, and cooperation on border and customs control and on issues relating to immigration and financial control. Among the root causes of terrorism were aggressive separatism and militant nationalism, which should be addressed very carefully by the international community.

40. In following up the current meeting, the States of the GUUAM Group would look for ways to establish close contacts with bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Maritime Organization. They would also present proposals for field trips by Committee experts to assist with legislative harmonization and draw the Committee's attention to new terrorist threats and potential targets, such as pipelines and means of transport.

41. **Mr. Sarsekov** (Anti-Terrorist Centre of the Commonwealth of Independent States) said that the membership of the Anti-Terrorist Centre of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) included specialists from all the CIS member States, who were preparing a list of priority issues relating to the fight against terrorism. The Centre also produced and distributed legal texts, statistics and other documents of interest to counter-terrorism specialists, provided legal and technical assistance to counter-terrorism organizations in the region and conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises. Training was also provided to government agencies engaged in counter-terrorism, often involving visits by officials from one State to the agencies of another.

42. **Ms. Sullivan** (International Organization for Migration) said that, because of its cross-border dimensions, international terrorism was a migration issue. It touched on a range of matters directly affecting immigration policy, in particular immigration fraud, national security, integration, ethnic affairs and citizenship. Immigration policy could be an important vehicle for better application of law enforcement and intelligence and other efforts to fight terrorism. Immigration authorities could contribute to national and international intelligence-gathering through direct encounters with illegal immigrants and through partner networks.

43. Measures were being widely adopted to enhance the integrity of security features and develop new ways of recording and verifying traveller and migrant identities. All the major immigrant-receiving States were looking at ways of increasing data exchange among authorities and with carriers and other States. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was conducting a model capacity-building programme in Jamaica, funded by the United States of America. On the technical assistance side, the programme aimed at the improvement of border management systems through the provision of technical inputs at airports and seaports and a targeted training programme. An automated border management system would give inspectors real-time information about travellers and their documents by querying databases and alert lists. Inspectors would have the information needed to identify unwanted or suspect travellers before they entered the country. Since information input was automated, inspectors would be able to spend more time interviewing travellers.

44. A key element in the proposed system was entry and exit tracking, whereby records would be created for each attempt to enter or leave the country. Entry/exit mismatches would be reported by the system to a central management location. The system would also help to authenticate travellers and their documents by querying passport- and visa-issuance databases. The addition of alert-list monitoring would provide the ability to query text-based and image-based alert lists in real time, facilitating the identification of individuals travelling under false identities or using lost or stolen documents and those who should be detained for other reasons.

45. The programme would support institutional strengthening through technical cooperation assistance in policy matters, legislation and regulations. That could be coupled with specific training in areas such as risk profiling for combating smuggling and trafficking, documentation fraud prevention, criminal intelligence capabilities related to migration management and responses to transnational organized crime.

46. Since no two countries were faced with identical challenges, responses must be tailored to specific needs. An important first step in identifying needs was an interactive assessment that encouraged open dialogue and ownership of the eventual interventions. In such an approach, programme components could be applied from a menu of tested modules to form a comprehensive and targeted strategy.

47. **Mr. Costa** (Financial Action Task Force for South America) said that the Financial Action Task Force for South America (GAFISUD) had an action plan calling for the adoption of national measures to implement the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing issued by FATF, regional exchanges of experience and expertise among national experts and increased collaboration with the United Nations and other relevant international bodies. GAFISUD had recently launched a self-assessment exercise on compliance with the special recommendations. It was placing strong emphasis on the need to reinforce scrutiny in the areas of currency exchanges remittances and international capital movements and endeavouring to coordinate its activities in that area with those of other relevant international bodies.

48. Coordination and training were of vital importance. A training centre for anti-money-laundering activities had been launched, and many activities had been developed in cooperation with the private sector. Such cooperation was particularly vital when it came to concrete implementation of legislation and related measures. An internationally agreed definition of terrorism was also badly needed. The new methodology of IMF and the World Bank was a very useful approach to combating money-laundering and would help the GAFISUD countries in the fulfilment of their international obligations.

49. **Mr. Manjaze** (Southern African Development Community) said that the member States of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) needed assistance in the area of implementation, particularly of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Not all SADC member States had ratified or

acceded to the 12 international counter-terrorism conventions. SADC countries needed help with the training of their security forces and assistance in coordinating the work of the many entities involved in security matters, both within and among States. They would benefit from more information and sharing of experience on the issues of money-laundering, border control and the proliferation of light weapons. He supported the remark of the previous speaker regarding the need for an agreed definition of terrorism.

50. **Mr. Buckley** (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) said that the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had begun implementation of a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, in response to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Following the current meeting, NATO would accelerate its work and take greater account of the activities of the Committee and of specialist international organizations in setting standards, and would use those standards as points of reference. If members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were having difficulties in implementing those standards, NATO could help them in a number of ways, including the use of trust funds, clearing houses and mentoring schemes.

51. **Mr. Seif El-Dawla** (Expert, Counter-Terrorism Committee) said that regional standards, measures and conventions had a crucial role to play in the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), through both a vertical and a horizontal approach. The vertical approach involved introducing common counter-terrorism measures into the domestic legislation of States in a given region. The horizontal approach was manifested in cooperation among States within the region. The effect of the vertical approach was considerable in international cooperation to combat terrorism, particularly the effective implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Regional organizations should be aware that the effect of their regional standards, measures and laws extended beyond the region and became internationally effective.

52. **Mr. Baity** (Egmont Group) said that financial intelligence units were an important end product of some of the technical assistance activities discussed during the current meeting. A financial intelligence unit was an agency within the Government whose function was to receive, analyse and disseminate information received from the financial sector. Such units could play a vital role in combating the financing of terrorism. The goal of the Egmont Group was to ensure that information was exchanged in a timely manner and to overcome the many artificial barriers to such exchanges among counterpart authorities. A critical problem was that the financing of terrorism was not yet universally defined characterized as an offence in such a way as to ensure the necessary sharing of information. It was highly important that Member States should fully understand the functions and activities of financial intelligence units.

53. **Mr. Mitropoulos** (International Maritime Organization), with reference to the remark by the representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning trust funds, recalled that the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held in December 2002 at IMO headquarters had called for the establishment of a maritime security trust fund to provide a dedicated source of financial support for maritime security technical cooperation activities. Consultations were currently under way within IMO to determine how to give effect to the resolution.

54. **Mr. Oskarsson** (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) said that, like the World Bank, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had found Internet databases to be a useful way of facilitating contact between potential assistance donors and recipients and recording assistance that had been provided. OSCE would contribute to the Committee's matrix of assistance needs; however, a more systematic procedure was required for updating the matrix and showing trends, gaps and overlaps in assistance requests. It must be borne in mind that many small countries wished to ratify international treaties but were unable to implement their provisions, so that there was a need to be more proactive in providing assistance. Furthermore, while donors were listed in the matrix, there was no mention of the implementing organizations. Criteria should also be developed for recording assistance that was related to resolution 1373 (2001) but was not requested through the Committee. It would be useful to create a second matrix to record assistance provided by the regional and subregional organizations.

55. Programme and project planning procedures should include contact with organizations active in the relevant thematic areas and geographic regions. OSCE had established partnerships with various States and organizations in other regions and cooperated with

them through, inter alia, their diplomatic missions in Vienna. It planned to focus on interregional aspects of counter-terrorism cooperation by organizing a meeting with out-of-area organizations in Vienna in the near future.

56. **Mr. Spicka** (International Criminal Police Organization) said that the frightening threat of bioterrorism had been largely ignored by the global counter-terrorism effort. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) had embarked on a biocriminalization and bioterrorism initiative in cooperation with the European Police Office (Europol).

57. **Mr. Kellman** (International Criminal Police Organization), referring to the new Interpol initiative, said that pathogens could be transported undetected through any airport. Prevention was essential, since the consequences of a bioterrorist attack were too grave for the world to take satisfaction from prosecution after the event. Bioterrorism was not necessarily a more serious problem than other forms of terrorism, but it did raise unique issues, such as how to regulate access to pathogens and ensure the security of biopharmaceutical laboratories without impeding the legitimate development of that sector, particularly in the developing world; how to establish transport and customs controls that would prevent the smuggling of deadly biological agents; and how to monitor biological research, which was essential to the health and welfare of the world's population but could be diverted for catastrophic purposes.

58. The new initiative would analyse national legislation, develop white papers on relevant issues and offer workshops for scientists, law-enforcement officials, diplomats and representatives of international organizations. He invited all participants in the special meeting of the Committee to share their expertise with Interpol.

59. **The Chairman** said that he would recommend to the Permanent Representative of Spain, who would soon replace him as Chairman of the Committee, that a meeting with representatives of Interpol should be held in the near future.

60. **Ms. Richards-Johnson** (Caribbean Community) said that her region did not lack political will or knowledge in the area of counter-terrorism. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had helped the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) establish a legislative drafting facility. Assistance in the area of legislation had also been provided by other organizations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The problem for Caribbean States was how to implement that legislation, since they lacked enforcement and regulatory mechanisms, particularly in the areas of border control, domestic security, exchange of intelligence and contingency planning in the event of a terrorist incident. As a potential zone of terrorist activity, the Caribbean needed to strengthen its capacities and was grateful for the assistance it had received from a number of organizations; however, greater coordination between such providers was needed. It was also time for an open, cooperative effort to establish international standards for counter-terrorism. She joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force in calling for a United Nations convention against money-laundering. Lastly, she thanked the Assistance Expert for his efforts on behalf of the CARICOM States.

61. **Ms. Prost** (Commonwealth Secretariat) said that the delivery of assistance would be improved if a second matrix of needs were established to record the expertise and capacities of the regional organizations. The Commonwealth Secretariat often received assistance requests that it was unable to meet and would like to be able to refer the requesting States to more appropriate sources. In addition to reporting to the Committee on legal and other problems that arose during its discussions with its member States, it would be useful for the Commonwealth Secretariat to meet with the Committee's experts in order to learn whether other regions faced similar problems and to seek solutions for them.

62. **The Chairman** pointed out that a dialogue with the Committee's experts could be conducted at any time through electronic mail.

63. **Mr. Khoo** (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) said that it was important for banks to know their customers. The Basel Committee set prudential standards for banks. Those standards had been incorporated into the common methodology developed by FATF, IMF and the World Bank. It also recommended that where the financing of terrorism was suspected, banks should provide information and full assistance to the relevant enforcement agencies. In the area of assistance, representatives of the Basel Committee secretariat visited States in order to explain the prudential standards. The Bank for International

Settlements, where the Basel Committee secretariat had its headquarters, had established a Financial Stability Institute, which disseminated information on best practices in banking supervision and could conduct focus seminars for regional groups.

Conclusions and closure of the meeting

64. **Ms. Brizuela de Ávila** (Organization of American States) said that the Organization of American States (OAS) would like to host another meeting with the Committee and the regional organizations at its headquarters in Washington.

65. **The Chairman** said that he would follow up on that offer and urged donor States to provide the necessary funding.

66. Summarizing the achievements of the special meeting, he noted that participants had laid stress on the importance of sharing information on existing global standards and codes in the field of counter-terrorism. The information provided by organizations should contain clearly written guidelines and interpretive notes in non-specialist language. The Committee would establish a web site on which such information could be posted.

67. While the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) was compulsory for States Members of the United Nations, compliance with many standards and codes was voluntary but should be encouraged. The Committee would endeavour to provide assistance to Governments that needed to amend their legislation and modify their practice and to regional and subregional organizations that lacked the necessary tools to monitor progress in those areas.

68. A coordinated, consistent approach to monitoring was needed. It was important to ensure that newly developed standards were consistent with existing ones and that human rights concerns were taken into account. The burden of reporting could be reduced if the relevant organizations posted on their web sites as much information as possible on their assessments and conclusions as models for other monitoring bodies; there was no need to mention specific States. The regional and subregional organizations should also develop machinery for collecting and passing on to their members the information that they received from international bodies.

69. Assistance providers should bear in mind that, while developing countries might have the necessary political will, they also needed tools and training in order to strengthen their counter-terrorism capacity as part of an overall development strategy. The Committee's mandate did not allow it to make the victims of terrorism its primary concern, but the regional and subregional organizations should take their needs into account and remember that a single major terrorist act could damage a region's economy for a long period of time. It was therefore in their interests to strengthen the capacities of their member States. Information-sharing was essential; the regional and subregional organizations should inform the Committee as they established links within and among themselves and should share the action plans which they developed. The Washington conference to be hosted by OAS would be an important step in that process.

70. The next phase of the global counter-terrorism effort would involve building on the existing political will and knowledge in order to improve implementation through meetings, technical cooperation, training, identification of needs and facilitation of assistance. As a result of the special meeting, the regional and subregional organizations knew who their potential partners were. They should urge their member States to request assistance as needed and ensure that no State fell below the standards set for their regions. The Committee would remain in contact with all participants in the special meeting and would develop an expanded directory of contact points. Organizations, in turn, should make sure that the contact information that they submitted to the Committee was current. He would discuss with the Committee the development of a new assistance matrix that would reflect regional activities.

71. The Committee's fundamental goal was to make it easier for Member States to meet their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001). In order to do so, it needed information (preferably in one place) on standards, codes and best practices; its directory of counter-terrorism information and sources of assistance was designed to serve that purpose. New ideas, such as the proposal by the representative of NATO regarding the establishment of trust funds, were welcome. The regional organizations should identify gaps in implementation capacities. The Committee, for its part,

would develop databases compatible with those of other bodies, including the World Bank.

72. The assistance provided by participants in the special meeting should be operational, timely and results-oriented and should focus more closely on training and on coordination between donor mechanisms, bearing in mind the need to avoid duplication. There could be no further excuse for ignorance of what other relevant bodies were doing. Different donors and States would, of course, have different priorities; the Committee would keep in touch with all relevant organizations and develop its own priorities through input from its experts.

73. Counter-terrorism goals for the coming year should include the establishment of a global information network, not necessarily under that name. Participation would, of course, be voluntary for the regional organizations, since resolution 1373 (2001) was binding only on States Members of the United Nations. However, he hoped that every organization represented in the room would have or develop, with assistance from the Committee or from other sources as needed, a mechanism for the ongoing exchange of information. The Committee had endeavoured to set a standard for transparency; he was aware that such an approach was not the normal operating mode of some organizations, but the special meeting should make it easier in the future.

74. Political will must be translated into implementation; each participant, on the basis of the day's discussion, should develop an action plan for ensuring compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), including an honest evaluation of its own assistance needs. If possible, each organization should develop an electronic database accessible by others. Assistance providers, and particularly major donors such as OSCE, the European Union, the United States of America and IMF, should set themselves the goal of meeting all reasonable requests for assistance in the area of counter-terrorism during the coming year. The Committee could serve as a catalyst and could help coordinate funding for training programmes.

75. A follow-up kit on the special meeting would be compiled and sent to all participants. Organizations were invited to send any additional material which they would like to have reproduced in summary form.

76. During the next period, the Committee would begin to evaluate the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), paragraph 4, which dealt with weapons of mass destruction. To that end, it would set up a process for working with organizations active in that area, including Interpol, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Draft outcome document

77. **The Chairman** drew attention to a draft outcome document and read out a series of amendments that had been proposed by various participants. The first sentence in paragraph 3 would be reworded to state that specific action points had been provisionally agreed by participants, subject to approval by their operational headquarters. A comma, followed by the words "and information about their activities and mechanisms in the counter-terrorism field", would be inserted at the end of paragraph 3 (a); the words "and representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee" would be added after "each other's representatives" in paragraph 3 (d); and the words "the rule of law and" would be inserted after "respect for" in paragraph 3 (e). The words "of contact points responsible" would be added after "network" in paragraph 4 (a); a comma and the words "mechanisms and institutions" would follow "relevant activities" in paragraph 4 (b); and the words "laid down by international organizations which are" would be deleted from paragraph 4 (e). Lastly, the word "similar" would be replaced by "periodic" in paragraph 5.

78. He said that the outcome document, while not legally binding, would serve as a public expression of participants' commitment to the course of action described therein. If he heard no objection, he would take it the draft outcome document was provisionally agreed by participants.

79. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.